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SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AS INTERPRETED BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT*
By E. G. TRIMBLE**
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution reads as
follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The history of its adoption in 1789 by the first Congress under
the Constitution as part of the Federal Bill of Rights is well
known.' But its real significance for the American people had to
be determined by the U. S. Supreme Court as cases under the
amendment came before it.
The first important case which came before the Court was
that of Boyd v. United States.2 It was so important that it merits
detailed treatment. The case arose on an information in rem,
filed by the U. S. District Attorney, in a cause of seizure and
forfeiture of property against 35 cases of plate glass seized by the
collector of revenue as having been imported in fraud of the
revenue laws. The fifth section of an act of Congress of 1874
provided that in any proceeding other than a criminal proceeding,
arising under the revenue laws, the Court could in its discretion
on motion by the Government issue an order to a defendant or
claimant to produce his books, invoices, and papers which might
tend to prove any allegation made by the U. S. Government. If
the papers were produced, they could be used as evidence; if they
were not produced, the allegations of the District Attorney in mak-
* This is the first of two installments of this article. The second installment
will appear in a succeeding issue of the Journal.
**Professor -of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. A.B.,
Berea College; Ph.D.; Yale University; member of Kentucky Bar.
I The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Con-
stitution, Nelson B. Lasson, Tim JonNs HoP mNs PRss (1987).
116 U. S. 616 (1885).
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ing the motion for the court order would be taken as confessed.
The defendant in this case on order from the Court produced the
papers but objected to the validity of the order, to the law under
which it was issued, and to the use of the papers against him. The
validity of the law was challenged as being contrary to the Fourth
Amendment, as well as to the Fifth which protects a person against
self-incrimination. The lower court permitted the evidence to be
used and a judgment of forfeiture was given. The circuit court
affirmed. The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion reversed
the decision and declared the law unconstitutional.
Justice Bradley, who wrote the opinion, first dealt with the
Government's argument that the mere ordering that the papers
be produced under the Act of 1874 was not the same as a search for
and seizure of papers (which had been authorized in Acts of Con-
gress of 1863 and 1867, which laws had been replaced by the law
of 1874.) He pointed out that failure to produce the papers re-
sulted in the allegations of the Government being taken as con-
fessed and said the proceedings "accomplish the substantial object
of those acts (of 1863 and 1867) in forcing from a party evidence
against himself." He concluded:
". .. that a compulsory production of a man's private
papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to
forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a
search and seizure would be; because it is a material in-
gredient and effects the sole object and purpose of search
and seizure."s
Having thus arrived at the conclusion that compulsory produc-
tion of a man's papers to be used against him in an action to for-
feit his property was the same as a search and seizure, he took up
the principal question, that is, whether a search and seizure of a
man's papers, or its equivalent, to be used against him in a pro-
ceeding to forfeit his property for fraud of the revenue laws was
an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
To the argument that this was a legitimate proceeding sanctioned
by long usage, he replied that the Court failed to find any usage
or contemporary construction of the Constitution to support the
, Id. at 622.
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argument. He said that the act of Congress of 1863 which per-
mitted such practice was the first act in this country or in England
which purported to authorize such proceeding. The act under
which the writs of assistance were used in the colonies, he stated,
did not go so far, for it "only authorized the examination of ships
and vessels and persons found therein.., and sic to enter into and
search any suspected vaults, cellars, and warehouses" for the pur-
pose of finding goods prohibited from being imported or exported
or on which duties were not paid. "The search for and seizure of
stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed
to avoid the payment thereof," he continued, "are totally different
things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and
papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein con-
tained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things
differ toto coelo. In the one case, the Government is entitled to
the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
' 4
He then pointed out a number of practices which were con-
sidered as exceptions to the general rule and to the Fourth
Amendment. The seizure of stolen goods was permitted by the
common law; the seizure of goods in the enforcement of revenue
laws had been permitted by English statutes and by an act of the
first Congress under the Constitution; so also could goods be
seized which it was unlawful for a person to have in his possession
for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coins,
lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc. All these exceptions,
however, were different from the present action in that in connec-
tion with these exceptions either the Government or other in-
dividuals had a claim against the goods, whereas in the present
action the Government attempted "to extort from the party his
private books and papers to make him liable for a penalty or to
forfeit his property."5
He then entered into an historical review in order to ascertain
what proceedings were meant to be included in the Fourth
Amendment as "unreasonable searches and seizures." He referred
to the controversy in Boston in 1761 over the use by British
revenue officers of writs of assistance empowering them in their
discretion to search suspected places for smuggled goods. The
,Id. at 623.
5 id. at 624.
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legality of these writs was challenged by James Otis, and John
Adams was quoted by Justice Bradley as having said that in this
controversy "the child of Independence was born."
The controversy in England the following year involving the
use of general writs was reviewed. There, writs that were general
as to the places to be searched and the goods to be seized were
used to seize copies of The North Briton, published by John
Wilkes, and The Monitor or British Freeholder, published by
John Entwick. In both instances, court actions favorable to the
editors and against the use of the writs were obtained. But it was
the case of Entwick v. CarringtonG involving the publication of
The Monitor which resulted in the more celebrated decision.
This opinion Justice Bradley discussed fully. The case involved
the legality of a writ by the Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, for
the seizure of Entwick together with his books and papers on a
charge of seditious libel. Entwick brought an action in trespass
against the King's messengers who carried out the search for and
the seizure of the books and papers. Lord Camden wrote an ex-
haustive opinion concerning the authority of the Secretary to" issue
such a warrant. After dwelling upon the seriousness of the power
claimed by the Secretary, Lord Camden said the "law to warrant
it should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant. The
great end for which men entered into society was to secure their
property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in
all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some
public law for the good of the whole. . . . Papers are the owner's
goods and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far
from enduring a seizure that they will hardly bear an inspection;
and though the eye cannot.., be guilty of a trespass, yet where
private papers . . . are carried away the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass."
He then asked where the law was that gave a magistrate such a
power, and replied, "I can safely answer there is none; and there-
fore it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a
practice legal which would be subversive of all the comforts of
society." He next discussed the similarity between the claimed
authority in this case and the case of seizure of stolen goods, and
pointed out the difference.
019 State Trials (Howell, 1829).
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"In the one, I am permitted to seize my own goods, which
are placed in the hands of a public officer, till the felon's
conviction shall entitle me to restitution. In the other, the
party's own property is seized before and without conviction
and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his
innocence is declared by acquittal."
He went on to point out that even stolen goods could not be
seized except by use of a valid warrant. He discussed the argument
that such a search is a useful means of detecting offenders by dis-
covering evidence, and said,
"I wish some cases had been shown, where the law
forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process.
There is no process against papers in civil causes .... In
the criminal law, such a proceding was never heard of.
• . . It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to
accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling
self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem
that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same prin-
ciple. Then too, the innocent would be confounded with
the guilty."
7
Justice Bradley assumed that every American statesman dur-
ing our revolutionary period was familiar with the case of Entwick
v. Carrington as a "monument of English freedom", and that they
accepted it "as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional
law when the Fourth Amendment was drafted." The principles
laid down in this great case he said,
"apply to all invasions on the part of the Government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggrava-
tion; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a mans
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evi-
dence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods is
within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other."
Later on in this part of the opinion, he said,
'Quoted by Justice Bradley, id. at 627.
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"Any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath,
or compelling the production of his private books and
papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is
contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhor-
rent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the pur-
poses of despotic powers; but it cannot abide the pure at-
mosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."
8
He then turned to a consideration of whether this was a
criminal proceeding, for the fifth section of the act of 1874 ex-
pressly excluded production of one's papers in a criminal proceed-
ing. He concluded that actions to forfeit might be civil in form
but were "in their nature criminal" and were within the scope
of the Fourth Amendment and of that part of the Fifth Amend-
ment protecting a man from being "compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." He closed by pointing out
that:
"illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing... by silent approaches and slight deviation from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by ad-
hering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued. A close and literal construction deprives them of
half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It
is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment
thereon."O
A number of things about the decision should be emphasized.
In the first place, since this was in form a civil proceeding, the
Court could have affirmed the lower court's decision. Instead,
however, it leaned over backward to protect the individual's right
by holding that the action was in substance criminal. Secondly, it
held that compulsory production of a man's private papers to be
used against him in a criminal case or to forfeit his property was
the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure, and hence
violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Of course, there
was, technically, no search or seizure at all in this case. The de-
8 Id. at 632.9 Id. at 635. Justice Miller and the Chief Justice joined in a separate opinion
concurring with Justice Bradley's opinion as to the Fifth Amendment only.
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fendant was ordered to produce his papers and if he did not do so
the allegations made by the Government's attorney in making the
motion for the court order would be taken as confessed; if he did
produce them and they contained no incriminating evidence,
there would be no self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
It was the principle involved-that it was contrary to the prin-
ciples of a free government for the government to invade one's in-
defeasible right to personal security, personal liberty and private
property-that caused the Court to consider this a violation of
both amendments and to make it the duty of the Court to protect
these rights.
The next occasion that the Supreme Court had to consider the
Fouth Amendment was in 1904 in Adams v. New York.'0 In this
case, New York officers had a warrant to search Adams' office for
policy slips used in gambling. The slips were found and also cer-
tain private papers not included in the warrant were seized and
introduced at the trial to help convict Adams. He objected to the
use of the papers that were not included in the warrant on the
ground of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. His objection was
overruled, he was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals. He then appealed to the U. S.
Supreme Court under the 14th Amendment where his conviction
was again sustained.
Justice Day spoke for the court in an opinion which because
of its confusion almost defies analysis.'" In the first place there
would seem to be an inescapable question of jurisdiction, for, since
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply only to the National
Government, the court could have jurisdiction only if the 14th
Amendment made the Fourth and Fifth apply to the States. But
the opinion stated that the court did not feel called upon to dis-
cuss that question because the court was convinced there "has
been no violation of these constitutional restrictions." Of course,
there could have been no violation if they did not apply to the
States, and the New York Court of Appeals had taken the position
1 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
See J. Day's explanation below in Weeks case; Justice Holmes in the
Silverthorne case where he says admissibility of the evidence was raised for the
first time at the trial; while in Hale v. Henkel, Justice Brown said the decision was
based on principle of not raising a collateral issue by looking into the method by
which evidence was obtained.
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that there was no federal question involved for this very reason.
This position was also taken by the attorneys for New York before
the Supreme Court. But the Court would not say whether the
amendments did or did not apply to the States.
After having said there had been no violation of these amend-
ments, Justice Day explained that the question of the admissibility
of the evidence was not raised in an attempt "to resist an unlawful
seizure of private papers of the plaintiff in error but arose upon
objections to the introduction of testiriony clearly competent as
tending to establish the guilt of the accused." In such cases, he
said, "the weight of authority as well as reason limits the inquiry
to the competency of the proffered testimony and the courts do
not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was ob-
tained,"12 and he quoted a general statement from Greenleaf that
a "court will not take notice how they (subjects of evidence) were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully." If the Court was go-
ing to assume jurisdiction and adopt this rule of procedure, it was
not necessary to say whether or not the amendments were violated.
But Justice Day seemed to assume that in some mysterious way
the manner in which the use of the evidence was objected to had
some bearing on whether the amendments had been violated.
Apparently he meant that a court should not look into the
methods by which evidence has been obtained unless it is forced
to do so by the type of the legal action brought, for he went on to
say that the "Supreme Court of New York before which the de-
fendant was tried was not called upon to issue process or make any
order calling for the production of private papers of the accused,
nor was there any question presented as to the liability of the
officer for the wrongful seizure or of the plaintiff in error's right
to resist with force the unlawful conduct of the officer." It is not
easy to see why the protection of a right guaranteed in the Con-
stitution should depend upon the form of action brought if the
Court has a duty, as the opinion in the Boyd case said, to protect
those rights and especially when as in this case the Court could
have protected the right by merely changing a rule of practice.
Further on in his opinion, Justice Day seemed to assume that
the papers were legally seized as "incidental" to the execution of
12 1d. at 594.
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a valid warrant, for after he pointed out that stolen goods, instru-
ments of crime, gambling devices, etc., could admittedly be seized
with a warrant, he said, "the contention is, that if, in the search
for instruments of crime, other papers are taken, the same may
not be given in evidence. As an illustration: if a search warrant
is issued for stolen property and burglars' tools be discovered and
seized, they are to be excluded from testimony by force of these
amendments. We think they were not intended to have that ef-
fect." This assumption (which he clearly expressed in the Weeks
case below) is interesting in view of the fact that the Court of Ap-
peals of New York13 assumed that the seizure was illegal but, not
having the equivalent of the Fourth Amendment in the State con-
stitution, it followed the rule against raising the collateral issue
about how evidence was obtained. Furthermore, any supposed
analogy between the seizure of burglars' tools and the seizure of a
man's private papers is of course lacking in any legal validity, for
according to the reasoning in the Boyd case and in the Entwick
case, the seizures of the two items are very different. The in-
dividual has no right to have burglar tools in his possession and
the Government has a primary right to seize them; in the case of
private papers the owner has a primary right to them and the Gov-
ernment has no right to them.
Justice Day made a feeble attempt to distinguish the Boyd case
by saying the law there involved "virtually compelled the de-
fendant to furnish testimony against himself ... and ran counter
to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The security intended
to be guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment," he said, ". . . is
designed to prevent violations of private security in person and
property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home of the
citizen by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpation when at-
tempted. But the English and nearly all of the American cases
have declined to extend the doctrine to the extent of excluding
testimony which has been obtained by such means, if it is other-
wise competent."14 No cases were cited.
It is difficult to see why the papers in this case were not seized
"See, People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903). See also, People
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1885).
under "judicial sanction" if they were seized as "incidental" to the
execution of a valid warrant. Whether they were so seized or
whether seized illegally, it would seem that the protection which
the Fourth Amendment was said to provide was called for unless
the Court was willing to ignore a provision of the Constitution
which it had held in the Boyd case restricted the power of Con-
gress itself. And even though the Court wished to adopt the com-
mon law rule and not look into the methods by which the evidence
was obtained, it did not need to go further and say that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were not violated. That is a very different
thing from saying it would not look at the methods used in secur-
ing the evidence. Saying the amendments were not violated was
both unnecessary and, it is believed, unwise. The conclusion
seems inescapable that the opinion was confused, badly written,
and according to later decisions, incorrectly decided.
The next important case that came before the Supreme Court
was TVeeks v. United States.15 The defendant in this case was con-
victed in a federal district court for sending lottery tickets through
the mails in violation of a federal statute. State police officers and
later a federal marshall entered the defendant's home without a
warrant and seized some private letters concerning his connection
with the lottery. These letters were used against him at the trial
over his objection, made before the trial started and again after
the jury was sworn, that the search and seizure were made in viola-
tion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Justice Day again
wrote the opinion of the Court reversing the lower court and hold-
ing the evidence was seized in violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. In dealing with the Fourth Amendment, he re-
ferred to its history as set forth by Justice Bradley in the Boyd
case. He said:
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the Courts
of the United States and federal officials in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints
as to the exercise of such power and authority and to for-
ever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether ac-
cused of a crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
-282 U.S. 383 (1914).
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and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our federal
system with the enforcement of the laws."1
The tendency of enforcement officers to violate rights of per-
sons accused of crime, he said "should find no sanction in the judg-
ment of the Courts . . . to which people of all conditions have a
right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."1 7
"The United States marshall could," he continued, "only have
invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant
issued as required by the Constitution upon sworn information
and describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which
search was to be made." This not having been done, and there
having been made a "seasonable application" for the return of the
evidence, the opinion held that the accused's constitutional
rights had been violated.
Justice Day was faced with his opinion in Adams v. New York,
and he said the court below had doubtless relied upon what the
government now claimed to be the correct rule as laid down in
the Adams case that the Court would not inquire into the methods
by which the letters had been acquired. He made a rather unsuc-
cessful effort to distinguish the case. He said that "the decision
in that case rests upon the incidental seizure made in the execu-
tion of a legal warrant, and the application of the doctrine that a
collateral issue will not be raised to ascertain the source from
which testimony, competent as a criminal case, comes." A careful
reading of the opinion shows that the decision was based largely on
the principle that the court would not raise a collateral issue by
looking into the method by which competent evidence was ac-
quired, although both principles were mentioned. The New York
courts based their decisions on the collateral issue rule, but as will
appear this was not the rule followed later by the Supreme Court.
Such a view would make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment and
of the Court's duty to protect rights under it. In fact, the rule per-
mitting the seizure of articles unnamed in a warrant as being
seized "incidentally" to a lawful search would seem also to destroy
the provision of the Amendment requiring the warrant par-
ticularly to describe the "things to be seized."
1" Id. at 391.
'7 1d. at 392.
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In 1921, the case of Gouled v. United States18 came before the
Court. Gouled and Vaughn were suspected of conspiracy to de-
fraud the government through contracts to supply it with clothing
and equipment. One Cohen, a private in the army, attached to
the Intelligence Department, having known Gouled, went on in-
struction from his superior to make what was ostensibly a friendly
call on Gouled. While Gouled was out of the office, Cohen seized,
without any warrant, a number of papers, later used as evidence
against Gouled and over his objection that their use violated the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Because Gouled did not learn of
the seizure of some of the papers until they were introduced at the
trial, his objection to their use was not made until after the trial
started. The lower court admitted the evidence, but on what
ground was not made clear. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Clark, held the seizure and use of the papers con-
trary to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Clark said the objection
by Gouled to the use of the papers, "coming as it did promptly
upon the first notice the defendant had that the Government was
in possession of the papers, the rule of practice relied upon that
such an objection will not be entertained unless made before trial,
was obviously inapplicable." The Court had pointed out in the
Weeks case that a "seasonable" demand had been made before
trial for a return of the evidence. It did not, however, make this
seasonable demand a requirement. He went on to say as to the
method by which entrance was obtained,
"The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment is against all
unreasonable searches and seizures, and if for a Government
officer to obtain entrance to a man's house or office by force
or by illegal threat or show of force, amounting to coercion,
and then to search for and seize his private papers would be
an unreasonable and therefore a prohibited search and
seizure, and it certainly would be, it is impossible to suc-
cessfully contend that a like search and seizure would be a
reasonable one if only admission were obtained by stealth
instead of by force or coercion."19
The Boyd case, he said, would make this a violation of the
Fifth Amendment, also.
- 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
9 9p. 805.
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Three other private papers involved in this case had been
taken from Gouled's office under a warrant. Justice Clarke
pointed out that the only interest the Government had in the
documents as far as the record showed, was to use them as evidence
against the defendant, and this could not be done under the
Fourth Amendment under the rule in the Boyd case.
Two additional questions were raised by the record and con-
sidered by the Court. The first was whether evidence legally
seized under a warrant charging the defendant with one crime
could be used against him for a different offense. Justice Clarke
answered that evidence legally acquired could be used in con-
nection with any crime. The second question was whether, when
papers had been seized as evidence and before trial a motion to
have the evidence returned had been denied by the judge, later a
trial court under a different judge is bound to consider the method
by which the papers were obtained when they are offered in
evidence and objected to. Justice Clark said it was plain the trial
court had acted on the principle that a court will not stop to in-
quire how relevant evidence has been acquired. This rule was,
though, a rule of procedure to be applied according to circum-
stances. We think rather, he said, "that it is a rule to be used to
secure the ends of justice under the circumstances presented by
each case, and where, in the progress of a trial, it becomes prob-
able that there has been an unconstitutional seizure of papers, it is
the duty of the trial court to entertain an objection to their admis-
sion or a motion for their exclusion and to consider and decide the
question as then presented, even where a motion to return the
papers may have been.denied before trial. A rule of practice must
not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitu-
tional right.' 20 This, of course, is exactly the opposite of the posi-
tion taken by the Court in Adams v. New York above, and seems
clearly to have overruled that case without the Court's saying so.
21
This case also makes clear that an objection to the use of illegally
seized evidence does not necessarily have to be made before trial.
These cases following the Adams case, show an increasing respect
on the part of the Court for individual rights and a greater willing-
ness to use its power to protect them.
0 pp. 312, 313.
'Justice Day, who wrote the opinion when the Adams case was still on the
Court, seems not to have dissented in either the Gouled or Amos case.
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Soon after the Gouled case, the decision in Amos v. United
States was handed down, involving again the principle of the
Adams case.22 In the Amos case agents of Internal Revenue with-
out any warrant went to Amos' home (that had a store room at-
tached) and told his wife that they were government officers and
had come to search the premises for untaxed liquor. She let them
in, and they found some untaxed liquor in the store room and
some in the house. At the trial, after a jury was sworn, defendant
petitioned the court to have the evidence returned to him because
the officers had no warrant for his arrest or to search his house.
The petition was overruled. Later in the trial, after the govern-
ment agents had testified, counsel for the defendant made a
motion to have their testimony stricken from the record because
it was based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The motion was denied. The government argued
on appeal that the first motion was made too late in the proceed-
ings and that the second was governed by the rule laid down in
Adams v. New York that the court will not during a trial open a
collateral question about the method by which evidence was ob-
tained. Justice Clarke, speaking for a unanimous court, said,
"Plainly the questions thus presented for decisions are ruled by
the conclusions in the Gouled case. The first petition should have
been granted, but it having been denied the motion should have
been sustained." "We need not consider whether it is possible for
a wife, in the absence of her husband ... to waive his constitu-
tional rights, for it is perfectly clear that under the implied
coercion here presented no such waiver was intended or effected,"
he said.
2 3
In the case of Burdeau v. McDowell,24 the Court was presented
with the question whether evidence seized illegally by private
persons could be used by the Government. Private parties repre-
senting a former employer of McDowell broke into his office and
carried away some of his papers turning them over to Burdeau, a
special assistant to the Attorney General, who was going to use
them in an effort to indict McDowell. McDowell petitioned the
district court to have them returned because they were seized in
- 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
"p. 317.
"256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Day again wrote the
opinion holding that "the Fourth Amendment gives protection
against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." He
then pointed out that no official had participated in the wrongful
seizure of the petitioner's property but "whatever wrong was done
was the act of individuals in taking the property of another....
We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress
against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private
property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such
remedies we are not now concerned."25 Justice Brandies (with Jus-
tice Holmes concurring) dissented. He pointed out that an officer
of the law received the papers, knowing them to have been stolen,
to use them against the owner, that the court had control over
the papers, and that it would restore them if they were still in the
hands of the thief. Although the Constitution might not require
their return, he said:
"Still I cannot believe that action of a public official is
necessarily lawful, because the same result might have been
attained by other and proper means. At the foundation of
our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to govern-
ment officials an exceptional position before the law and
which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. And in the development of our
liberty, insistence upon procedural regularity has been a
large factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort,
in its enforcement, to means which shock the common man's
sense of decency and fair play." *
This case marks the beginning of a division in the Court as to
the application of these rules where human rights were involved.
With the advent of National Prohibition, many difficult and
technical questions came before the Court involving adjustments
between the rights of the individual and the demands of gov-
ernment.
The application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
= p. 475.
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corporations during the period covered by the above cases caused
the Court some difficulty when Congress entered the field of regu-
lating interstate commerce. In Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Brimson,26 the Court sustained the power of Congress to author-
ize the Commission to require testimony before it and the produc-
tion of books and papers of the corporations subject to its control.
The constitutionality of the grant of power to the Commission to
require the production of a company's books and papers was not
actually raised but in deciding the case the Court said in a dictum:
"It was clearly competent for Congress to invest the
Commission with authority to require the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers,
tariffs, and contracts, agreements and documents relating to
any matter legally committed to that body for investiga-
tion."27
In the later case of I. C. C. v. Baird,28 the Court did have be-
fore it the constitutionality of the power of the Commission to
compel testimony and the production of books and papers in the
light of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But Congress had in
1893 passed a statute which provided immunity from punishment
for persons for testimony given before the Commission. Justice
Day, in the opinion of the Court, pointed out that the statute
protected the individual from self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment and that, according to the Boyd case, the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments meant practically the same thing. "Testimony
given under such circumstances," he said, "presents scarely a sug-
gestion of an unreasonable search and seizure. Indeed, the parties
seem to have made little objection to the inspection of the papers,
the contest was over their relevancy as testimony.
29
In Hale v. Henkel"9 a subpoena duces tecum was issued order-
ing Hale, secretary of a corporation under investigation for
alleged violation of the Anti-Trust Law, to appear before a federal
grand jury to testify and to bring certain documents of the com-
pany. Hale refused and was cited for contempt and appealed to
the Supreme Court. One ground of his defense was the Fourth
- 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
T p. 473.
194 U.S. 25 (1903).
p. 46.
"201 U.S. 43 (1906).
YENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
and Fifth Amendments. His appeal was denied. Justice Brown,
speaking for the majority of the Court, cited the immunity statute
of 1893 to answer the argument involving the Fifth Amendment.
He discussed the Fourth and again pointed out that in the Boyd
case the two amendments were considered as running together.
Subsequent cases, he said, had treated them as distinct and as hav-
ing separate functions. He went on to say, "We think it quite
clear that the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment
was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel,
through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in
court, of documentary evidence." Continuing he made a dis-
tinction "between an individual and a corporation" and said,
"The latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers
for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may
stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen." This distinction
was based on the theory that, "the corporation is a creature of the
State," "presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the pub-
lic," receive "special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the State." "It would be a strange anomaly,"
he said, "to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to
make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its
sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and
whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose." 31 After having
taken that position, however, he went on to say that he did not
want "to be understood as holding that a corporation is not en-
titled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment against un-
reasonable searches and seizure. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body, it
waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body."
' 2
He then examined the subpoena here used and found it "far
too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable," the num-
ber and variety of documents called for was entirely too great.
The reasoning was not entirely clear, but what it seemed to
amount to was that a corporation was in a slightly different posi-




Amendment since it owed its life and privileges to the State; but
at the same time for the State to require it to produce its records
for use as evidence against it, the procedure employed had to be
within the bounds of reason-judicial reason.
In the case of Willson v. United States,33 a contempt citation
against Willson as president of the corporation for failure to obey
a subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation itself, was up-
held and Willson was required to produce the papers even though
they might contain matter incriminating him personally. After
considering other questions raised in the case, Justice Hughes
said, "nor was the process invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
The rule laid down in the case of Boyd v. United States is not ap-
plicable here .... Possessing the privileges of a legal entity and
having records, books and papers, it is under a duty to produce
them when they may properly be required in the administration
of justice." 34 He went on to say "there is no unreasonable search
and seizure when a writ, suitably specific and properly limited in
scope, calls for the production of documents which as against
their lawful owner to whom the writ is directed, the party pro-
curing its issuance is entitled to have produced."3 5
Here again, as in Hale v. Henkel, the Court takes the view
that a corporation's papers may be seized and used if the order
for seizure is "reasonable", "specific", and "limited" in scope, and
also we see the view again expressed that because a corporation
enjoys special privileges it is in a slightly different position-a less
favorable position-than is an individual in claiming protection
under the Fourth Amendment.
In 1920, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,3 6 the
Court had before it a clear case of illegal seizure by federal officers
without a warrant of written material from the office of the com-
pany. Copies were made of the documents and, after the originals
had been returned under court order, the evidence illegally seized
was used to subpoena the originals for use by the grand jury. The
company refused to obey the subpoena, and its refusal was upheld.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority of the Court said, in
u221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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effect, that the rule of the Weeks case could not be evaded by tak-
ing two steps instead of one. "The essence," he said, "of a pro-
vision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is
that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court, but that it shall not be used at all." On the question of
whether a corporation was entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, he said,
"In Linn vs. United States (1918, 251F476), it was thought
that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground
that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful
search and seizure are to be protected even if the same re-
sult might have been achieved in a lawful way."
3 7
The above case was followed in 1924 by the case of Federal
Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company.38 In this case,
the Commission had petitioned the Federal District Court for a
mandamus to compel the Company to submit records, contracts,
memos, and correspondence for inspection to enable the Com-
mission to prepare a report for the U. S. Senate in response to a
Senate Resolution calling for such report. Section 6 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act authorized the Commission "to require
reports and answers under oath to specific questions, furnishing
the Commission such information as it may require" on the sub-
jects under the Commission's control. The lower court refused
the mandamus, and was supported by the Supreme Court. Justice
Holmes, writing the opinion for the Supreme Court said the Com-
mission claimed an unlimited right to papers. But, he said, "The
right of access given by the statute is to documentary evidence-not
to all documents, but to such documents as are evidence." "A gen-
eral subpoena in the form of these petitions would be bad," he
continued, because "Some evidence of materiality of the papers
demanded must be produced," citing Hale v. Hendel. "The mere
facts of carrying on a commerce not confined within state lines
and of being organized as a corporation do not make men's affairs
public," he concluded. He refused to discuss the question of
whether Congress could authorize a general fishing expedition
for evidence, for "nothing short of the most explicit language
p. 392.
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would induce us to attribute to Congress that intent." "It is con-
trary to the first principles of justice," he concluded, "to allow a
search through all the respondent's records, relevant and irrele-
vant, in the hope that something will turn up." 9 Here nothing
is said to the effect that a corporation is in any different position
from an individual in regard to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, but the rule in the Wilson case that a corporation's
papers could be subpoenaed and used against it if and when the
subpoena was reasonably specific and limited, was not disavowed.
Justice Holmes merely refused to assume that Congress intended
to authorize the Commission to engage in a general fishing expedi-
tion for evidence and denied the Commission's authority to order
the production of documents generally without regard to whether
they were relevant as evidence or not. The clarification of the
extent to which a corporation could claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment had yet to be worked out.
Be p. 806.
